Next #swad improvement: Make sure to #wipe #passwords from RAM directly after used. That's more of a #security precaution, because there *should* be no way how an attacker can access a running process' memory, but you never know which bugs surface .

Unexpectedly, that posed #portability issues. #C11 has #memset_s ... a pretty weird function, but suitable for wiping. It's there on #FreeBSD and on #OpenBSD. Not on #NetBSD though. But NetBSD offers the much saner #C23 function #memset_explicit. Looking at #Linux, there's neither. But there is the (non-standard!) #explicit_bzero .. and with glibc, it requires _DEFAULT_SOURCE to be defined as soon as you compile with a C standard version given to the compiler. This function exists on some other systems as well, but there's confusion whether it should be declared in string.h or strings.h.

Here's the full set of compile-tests I'm now doing, only to find the best way to really erase memory:
https://github.com/Zirias/swad/blob/master/src/bin/swad/swad.mk#L6

And if none of these functions is found, swad uses the "hacky" way that most likely works as well: Access the normal memset function via a volatile pointer.