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#postquantum

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Thorsten Leemhuis (acct. 1/4)<p>Linus on "[<a href="https://hachyderm.io/tags/Linux" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>Linux</span></a> <a href="https://hachyderm.io/tags/kernel" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>kernel</span></a>] Module signing and post-quantum crypto public key algorithms":</p><p>'"I'd suggest you worry more about the rumors that Kazakhstan is growing a veritable army of gerbils, and giving them all ABACUSES!</p><p>What's your plan for that imminent attack vector? Because they could be here any day.</p><p>Yes, yes, please stop using RSA and relying over-much on big prime numbers. But let's not throw the "Post Quantum" word around as if it was reality.</p><p>The reality of kernel security remains actual bugs - both in hardware and in software - not some buzzword."'</p><p><a href="https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-%3DwgYdf08uju5UrDZ9kEgsC9yrtBNOTzSX6zAbOdRfg%2BJkA@mail.gmail.com/" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="ellipsis">lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-%3Dwg</span><span class="invisible">Ydf08uju5UrDZ9kEgsC9yrtBNOTzSX6zAbOdRfg%2BJkA@mail.gmail.com/</span></a></p><p><a href="https://hachyderm.io/tags/LinuxKernel" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>LinuxKernel</span></a> <a href="https://hachyderm.io/tags/PostQuantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>PostQuantum</span></a></p>
Emory<p>there's a post-quantum federated key service that <a href="https://soc.kvet.ch/tags/infosec" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>infosec</span></a> may be interested in:</p><p>&gt; FOKS provides a secure, end-to-end encrypted Git hosting service. [...] the server never sees data or filenames in unencrypted form. This means that even if the server is compromised, your data is safe. FOKS is federated [...]</p><p>&gt; Additionally, FOKS uses modern PQ-secure public-key cryptography, so all end-to-end encrypted data is safe from quantum attacks.</p><p><a href="https://soc.kvet.ch/tags/postQuantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>postQuantum</span></a> <a href="https://soc.kvet.ch/tags/encryption" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>encryption</span></a> <a href="https://soc.kvet.ch/tags/git" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>git</span></a> </p><p><a href="https://foks.pub/" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="">foks.pub/</span><span class="invisible"></span></a></p>
C.<p>Daniel J. Bernstein (<a href="https://mindly.social/tags/djb" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>djb</span></a>, to those who know and love him [1]) has a new blog entry about the NIST post-quantum <a href="https://mindly.social/tags/cryptography" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>cryptography</span></a> standardization process that's been ongoing for some years. Also, follow him <span class="h-card" translate="no"><a href="https://mastodon.cr.yp.to/@djb" class="u-url mention" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">@<span>djb</span></a></span> .</p><p>If you're not aware of some of the controversy about how NIST is running this process, it's a must-read.</p><p><a href="https://blog.cr.yp.to/20250423-mceliece.html" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="ellipsis">blog.cr.yp.to/20250423-mceliec</span><span class="invisible">e.html</span></a></p><p>My $0.02: it sure looks like NIST is backstopping an attempt by the NSA to get everyone to standardize on cryptography <a href="https://mindly.social/tags/standards" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>standards</span></a> that the <a href="https://mindly.social/tags/NSA" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>NSA</span></a> knows how to break.</p><p>Again.</p><p>Yes, they did it before. If you read up on the Dual_EC calamity and its fallout, and how this time it was supposed to be different - open, transparent, secure - then prepare to be disappointed. NIST is playing <a href="https://mindly.social/tags/Calvinball" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>Calvinball</span></a> with their rules for this contest, yanking the rug out from under contenders that appear to be more <a href="https://mindly.social/tags/secure" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>secure</span></a> and better understood, while pushing alternatives that are objectively worse (<a href="https://mindly.social/tags/weaker" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>weaker</span></a> encryption, less studied, poorer <a href="https://mindly.social/tags/performance" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>performance</span></a>).</p><p>Frankly, I think organizations outside of the <a href="https://mindly.social/tags/USA" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>USA</span></a> would be foolish to trust anything that comes out of <a href="https://mindly.social/tags/NIST" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>NIST</span></a>'s current work. Well, those inside the USA too, but some of those may be forced by law to use whatever NIST certifies.</p><p>[1] Some people think djb is "prickly", not lovable. Oddly, it seems that the only people who say this are those who are wildly incorrect about code/algorithms and are being gently but publicly corrected about by djb at the time</p><p><a href="https://mindly.social/tags/quantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>quantum</span></a> <a href="https://mindly.social/tags/PostQuantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>PostQuantum</span></a> <a href="https://mindly.social/tags/PostQuantumCryptography" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>PostQuantumCryptography</span></a></p>
Tuta<p>Naughty or nice? Santa doesn’t need to know. 🎅❌ </p><p>Tuta’s encrypted calendar keeps your events so private, even Santa stays in the dark. 🔒🗓️</p><p> <a href="https://mastodon.social/tags/Privacy" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>Privacy</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.social/tags/Encryption" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>Encryption</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.social/tags/PostQuantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>PostQuantum</span></a></p>
Scott Francis<p>new from <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/AWS" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>AWS</span></a> last month - customer guidance for managing risk and compliance during the <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/postquantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>postquantum</span></a> migration process <a href="https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/customer-compliance-and-security-during-the-post-quantum-cryptographic-migration/" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="ellipsis">aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/</span><span class="invisible">customer-compliance-and-security-during-the-post-quantum-cryptographic-migration/</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/PQC" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>PQC</span></a></p>
Scott Francis<p>NOTE: this release deprecates RSA and other quantum-vulnerable algorithms by 2030, and disallows by 2035. If you're building something designed to last 5+ years, you need to be looking at ML-KEM and ML-DSA right now (and implementing crypto agility to ease adoption of these and future standards).<br> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/PQC" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>PQC</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/postquantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>postquantum</span></a></p>
Scott Francis<p>NIST has an initial public draft out of their guide to transitioning to <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/PQC" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>PQC</span></a> standards; required reading for implementers in the space. <a href="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2024/NIST.IR.8547.ipd.pdf" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="ellipsis">nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2</span><span class="invisible">024/NIST.IR.8547.ipd.pdf</span></a></p><p><a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/postquantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>postquantum</span></a></p>
Scott Francis<p>so <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/TIL" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>TIL</span></a> that the Linux Foundation is working on standalone implementations of FIPS 203, 204, and 205 that can pass formal verification and/or an external audit <a href="https://github.com/pq-code-package" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="">github.com/pq-code-package</span><span class="invisible"></span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/PQC" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>PQC</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/postquantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>postquantum</span></a></p>
Scott Francis<p>Central banks of Singapore and France have been testing out <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/postquantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>postquantum</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/PQC" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>PQC</span></a> for secured email; technical report linked from the bottom of this press release (based on an Outlook plugin from Crypto Next): <a href="https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/media-releases/2024/bdf-and-mas-conduct-groundbreaking-post-quantum-cryptography-experiment" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://www.</span><span class="ellipsis">mas.gov.sg/news/media-releases</span><span class="invisible">/2024/bdf-and-mas-conduct-groundbreaking-post-quantum-cryptography-experiment</span></a></p>
Scott Francis<p>OpenJDK proposals to adopt FIPS 203 and 204 (ML-KEM and ML-DSA) <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/PQC" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>PQC</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/postquantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>postquantum</span></a><br><a href="https://mastodon.cloud/@slashdot/113460582889048469" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="ellipsis">mastodon.cloud/@slashdot/11346</span><span class="invisible">0582889048469</span></a></p>
Scott Francis<p>interesting table of <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/postquantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>postquantum</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/PQC" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>PQC</span></a> initiatives by government and region around the world: <a href="https://www.gsma.com/newsroom/post-quantum-government-initiatives-by-country-and-region/" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://www.</span><span class="ellipsis">gsma.com/newsroom/post-quantum</span><span class="invisible">-government-initiatives-by-country-and-region/</span></a></p><p>(if you're a <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/GRC" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>GRC</span></a> person, this is something you should be keeping an eye on)</p>
Scott Francis<p>IETF has a draft up for <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/PQC" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>PQC</span></a> functionality baked into OpenPGP <a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-pqc/" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="ellipsis">datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft</span><span class="invisible">-ietf-openpgp-pqc/</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/postquantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>postquantum</span></a></p>
Alexandre Dulaunoy<p>Post-Quantum Cryptography in OpenPGP - an IETF draft</p><p><a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/openpgp" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>openpgp</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/pgp" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>pgp</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/postquantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>postquantum</span></a> </p><p>🔗 <a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-pqc/" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="ellipsis">datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft</span><span class="invisible">-ietf-openpgp-pqc/</span></a></p>
Blue Ghost<p>Post-quantum cryptography posts.</p><p>13.08.2024: NIST releases first three finalized PQC encryption standards.<br>Source: <a href="https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/08/nist-releases-first-3-finalized-post-quantum-encryption-standards" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://www.</span><span class="ellipsis">nist.gov/news-events/news/2024</span><span class="invisible">/08/nist-releases-first-3-finalized-post-quantum-encryption-standards</span></a></p><p>12.09.2024: GnuPG announces release of 2.5.1 for public testing, finalized PQC algorithms are supported.<br>Source: <a href="https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2024q3/000485.html" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="ellipsis">lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnup</span><span class="invisible">g-announce/2024q3/000485.html</span></a></p><p>PQC: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-quantum_cryptography" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="ellipsis">en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-qua</span><span class="invisible">ntum_cryptography</span></a><br>GnuPG: <a href="https://mastodon.online/@blueghost/111974048270035570" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="ellipsis">mastodon.online/@blueghost/111</span><span class="invisible">974048270035570</span></a><br>Harvest now, decrypt later: <a href="https://mastodon.online/@blueghost/111357939714657018" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="ellipsis">mastodon.online/@blueghost/111</span><span class="invisible">357939714657018</span></a></p><p><a href="https://mastodon.online/tags/PQC" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>PQC</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.online/tags/PostQuantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>PostQuantum</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.online/tags/Cryptography" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>Cryptography</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.online/tags/GnuPG" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>GnuPG</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.online/tags/GPG" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>GPG</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.online/tags/Encryption" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>Encryption</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.online/tags/E2EE" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>E2EE</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.online/tags/InfoSec" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>InfoSec</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.online/tags/Security" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>Security</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.online/tags/Privacy" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>Privacy</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.online/tags/QuantumSafe" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>QuantumSafe</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.online/tags/PGP" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>PGP</span></a></p>
Colan Schwartz<p>Go ahead and start implementing these, folks. Maybe get some help from a friendly neighborhood cryptographer, though, so you don't set them up incorrectly; we've seen this a lot with the current batch of algorithms. </p><p><a href="https://www.theregister.com/2024/08/14/nist_postquantum_standards/" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://www.</span><span class="ellipsis">theregister.com/2024/08/14/nis</span><span class="invisible">t_postquantum_standards/</span></a></p><p><a href="https://mastodon.social/tags/cryptography" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>cryptography</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.social/tags/postquantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>postquantum</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.social/tags/postquantumcryptography" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>postquantumcryptography</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.social/tags/encryption" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>encryption</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.social/tags/nist" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>nist</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.social/tags/infosec" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>infosec</span></a></p>
Scott Francis<p>Great analysis of a new paper from Fujitsu researchers ("Estimation of Shor's Circuit for 2048-bit Integers based on Quantum Simulator”); the author (head of quantum at Banco Santander) has become the most consistently insightful person in my LinkedIn feed, and this post is really worth a read. tl;dr - around the mid-2030s it will be more likely than not that a CRQC (cryptographically relevant quantum computer) will exist. <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/PQC" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>PQC</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/postquantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>postquantum</span></a> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/jaime-gomez-garcia_pqc-rsa-cryptography-activity-7233821796649582592-nLpS" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://www.</span><span class="ellipsis">linkedin.com/posts/jaime-gomez</span><span class="invisible">-garcia_pqc-rsa-cryptography-activity-7233821796649582592-nLpS</span></a></p>
Scott Francis<p>I dunno how many of you remember the crypto snake oil solutions that were a common problem in the late 90s, but I definitely feel that will be coming back in spades with the adoption of <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/PQC" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>PQC</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/postquantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>postquantum</span></a> crypto. Figuring out which things are from obvious kooks, which are well-meaning but misinformed sources, which are from legitimate experts who made a mistake on this particular paper, etc. is going to be a non-trivial problem for most people.</p>
Scott Francis<p>Nice video from NIST mathematicians and program managers talking about the new standards and the extensive planning that went into them (LinkedIn post includes a good summary): <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/jaime-gomez-garcia_pqc-activity-7229173718046932993-Ji_s" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://www.</span><span class="ellipsis">linkedin.com/posts/jaime-gomez</span><span class="invisible">-garcia_pqc-activity-7229173718046932993-Ji_s</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/PQC" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>PQC</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/quantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>quantum</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/postquantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>postquantum</span></a></p><p>Direct video link: <a href="https://cdnapisec.kaltura.com/index.php/extwidget/preview/partner_id/684682/uiconf_id/31013851/entry_id/1_9aq2t1cw/embed/dynamic" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="ellipsis">cdnapisec.kaltura.com/index.ph</span><span class="invisible">p/extwidget/preview/partner_id/684682/uiconf_id/31013851/entry_id/1_9aq2t1cw/embed/dynamic</span></a></p>
Scott Francis<p>Those of you with long memories may recall the hassle of adopting TLS 1.0 when it dropped, and then TLS 1.1, and then TLS 1.2 (and the mad scramble to update cipher suites post-Heartbleed, etc.).</p><p>We’re going to see that process all over again with adoption of FIPS 203, 204, and 205 over the next few years (the new NIST quantum crypto standards). I have to wonder if we collectively learned anything from the multiple previous rounds of crypto updates in infrastructures, or if our process is as broken as it ever was. (Rhetorical question here.)</p><p>Don’t just think about how to navigate the current moment; think about how to improve your process so that it’s less painful, and less expensive, to do the right thing the next time this comes along. It’s kind of like what Colin Chapman (founder of Lotus) used to say: “Adding speed makes you faster in the straights; adding lightness makes you faster everywhere.” Fixing your process will make it better now and in the future - don’t just address the current need with a quick and dirty tactical fix or a big manual effort; spend a little more time now and reap the benefits forever after.</p><p>This will not be the last time we need to do this. <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/PQC" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>PQC</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/postquantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>postquantum</span></a></p>
Scott Francis<p>Official announcement from NIST: <a href="https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/08/nist-releases-first-3-finalized-post-quantum-encryption-standards" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://www.</span><span class="ellipsis">nist.gov/news-events/news/2024</span><span class="invisible">/08/nist-releases-first-3-finalized-post-quantum-encryption-standards</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/PQC" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>PQC</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/quantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>quantum</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/postquantum" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>postquantum</span></a></p>